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When building and construction markets are analysed it is often at the project level, with 
markets defined by sector or structure type, procurement method or contract, size, 
complexity or other characteristic. Projects within a defined market are then grouped 
together to establish its importance, detached housing for example, or high-rise 
commercial. A distinction can be made, however, between a market made up of similar 
types of projects and the market for a single project. Such a market is created by a client 
as they go through the procurement process. This paper introduces the idea that 
procurement of a project creates a identifiable, though temporary, market for goods and 
services, and that such a market has distinctive characteristics that make it both 
interesting, as a source of testable hypotheses and further research, and important in 
developing our understanding of the industry and its dynamics. The research the paper 
reports on shows that the idea of project procurement as a mechanism for creating a 
market can utilise the elements of industry structure and competitive analysis that have 
traditionally been applied at the firm level. The paper concludes that this allows a new 
perspective on issues such as collusion, ruinous competition and cost uncertainty 
associated with the typical single price, sealed bid auction used for procurement in the 
building and construction industry. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Building and construction is a project-based industry. Building and construction markets 
are also analysed at the project level, defined by sector, building or structure type, 
procurement method or contract used, size, complexity or some other characteristic. 
Projects within a defined market are grouped together to establish its size and importance, 
detached housing for example, or high-rise commercial.  
A distinction can be made, however, between a market made up of similar types of 
projects and the market for a single project. Such a market is created by a client as they 
go through the procurement process. This paper introduces the idea that procurement of a 
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project creates a identifiable, though temporary, market for goods and services, and that 
such a market has distinctive characteristics that make it both interesting, as a source of 
testable hypotheses and further research, and important in developing our understanding 
of the industry and its dynamics.  
The research this paper reports on shows that the idea of project procurement as a 
mechanism for creating a market can utilise the elements of industry structure and 
competitive analysis that have traditionally been applied at the firm level. In particular, 
the extent of market power held, gained or lost by participants as the procurement process 
goes through the stages of pre-bid, tender, final bid and negotiation, or some variation of 
those stages, is an important factor. This has been recognised and discussed in previous 
research by Hillebrandt (2000), who was particularly interested in the client-contractor 
relationship pre and post tender. 
The contribution this paper makes is to extend that earlier discussion by considering 
market power in the context of issues such as collusion, ruinous competition and cost 
uncertainty associated with the typical single price, sealed bid auction used for 
procurement in the building and construction industry. 
 
THE MARKET FOR PROJECTS 
When building and construction markets are analysed it is also often it is often based on 
the types of project. Such markets can be, and have been, defined by a variety of 
characteristics. Government statistics are typically collected by sector, and then divided 
into building or structure type, shown in a generalised form in Table 1. Projects within a 
defined market are then grouped together to establish its size and importance, detached 
housing for example, or commercial developments. Because the data on industry activity 
and output is presented in these classifications, analysis of trends and forecasts of 
construction work are also usually found in this format. In Australia the Construction 
Forecasting Council (http://www.cfc.acif.com.au/summary.asp) provides bi-annual 
forecasts and data by sector and building type. 
 




Residential building  
 
Detached housing, medium density, high density, 
alterations and additions 
Non-residential building  Private - Retail, commercial, industrial, hotels 
 Public - Education, health, community 
Engineering construction  Bridges, ports, rail, electricity, roads, water and sewerage, 




Other typologies use the procurement system or contract used, financing method, size, 
complexity or some other characteristic of the project. Haas (2007), while not discussing 
construction directly, identified 10 “complexity dimensions” and three levels of risk for 
projects. Masterman (2002) has an exhaustive set of lists of project and client 
characteristics that can be used to classify projects. The public/private client distinction is 
one that is widely used. Flygberg et al. (2003) argue there is a separate and distinct set of 
megaprojects, and that the characteristics of these projects make them a focus of research 
in their own right. 
In a review of the research by Runeson (2000), Hillebrandt (2000) and Ive and Gruneberg 
(2000) on the characteristics of construction markets, de Valence (2011) found a wide 
range of views on the types of markets, the role of firms and relationships between firms 
and the products and services they provide within those markets. There was, however, 
universal agreement that building and construction is an industry of projects, made up of 
a series of markets for projects. 
 
A MARKET FOR ONE PROJECT 
Can an individual project become a temporary market in its own right? The definition of a 
market found in a standard economics text such as Layton et al. (2009: 80) is “any 
arrangement in which the interaction of buyers and sellers determines the price and 
quantity of goods and services exchanged”. By this criterion the act of procurement is 
indeed a market transaction. Procurement comes from the Latin word curare, meaning to 
acquire or to take care of, and the decision to buy requires agreement on price. 
The market for a single project is therefore created by a client as they go through the 
procurement process, regardless of the particular system or method of procurement 
followed. The client is the buyer of a bundle of goods and services from the contractor/s 
bidding or negotiating for the project, and their interaction on the scope (quantity) and 
price of the project is resolved when the agreement or contract is exchanged. 
If procurement of a project creates an identifiable, though temporary, market for goods 
and services, what are the distinctive characteristics of such a market? Clearly it is not 
like a conventional market described in a textbook. The characteristics of markets, found 
in Layton for example, are the number of buyers and sellers, the distinctiveness and 
substitutability of products, forms of competition, barriers to entry and concentration 
ratio, and the information and mobility of customers. 
A market with single buyer is known as a monopsony (the opposite of a monopoly with a 
single seller). The treatment of buyer power in economics is concerned with how 
downstream firms can affect the terms of trade with upstream suppliers. A buyer has 
monopsony power if they can reduce the price paid below competitive levels by 
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withholding demand. An important distinction is between monopsony power and 
bargaining power, or the bargaining strength that a buyer has with respect to suppliers. 
The lower price obtained from monopsony power is achieved by actually purchasing less, 
but with bargaining power is achieved by the threat of purchasing less (Inderst 2007). 
There are two conditions a buyer will have to meet to have substantial buying power: it 
can easily switch to alternative suppliers, sponsor new entry or self supply without 
incurring substantial sunk costs; or it is a gateway to the downstream market for its 
suppliers. The ACCC report (2008: 313) identified two factors other than outside options 
that may also influence the conduct and outcome of bilateral bargaining between 
suppliers and retailers. These factors were: 
 The role of information: are there information asymmetries regarding the 
different parties‟ knowledge of the other parties, for instance, regarding other 
parties‟ cost structures? An informational advantage may give rise to an 
advantage in terms of bargaining power. 
 Coordination (tacit or explicit) among suppliers: the presence of incentives for 
suppliers to undercut any supplier collusion (e.g. to obtain a large order from a 
retailer) may increase buyer bargaining power. 
The most important characteristic of a project as a market with the client as a single buyer 
is therefore the relative bargaining power on the buyer and seller sides of the negotiation. 
Unlike a monopsonist, the project client does not have extensive market power, defined 
as the ability to set prices. In fact, the construction client is often in a weak bargaining 
position because there is no market price available as a reference point when negotiating 
with potential suppliers. 
The second key difference is the one-off nature of the project. While few projects are 
unique in the sense of entirely different, because the fundamental elements of a type of 
building are found in most buildings of that type (e.g. steel reinforced concrete floors in 
high-rise, wooden frames in houses) each project represents a particular set of 
requirements in a specific, possibly unique combination. 
Two other characteristics are the opposite of conventional markets. Because of the one-
off nature of the project, it follows that there is no substitute easily available to the client 
(especially once committed to going ahead). It is also probable that the contractor will be 




Bargaining power is different from monopsony power, and found in the bilateral 
negotiations over terms and conditions of supply between trading partners. In a 
 554 
 
bargaining framework, buyer power is the ability to extract surplus from a supplier and 
differences in buyer power are reflected in differences in individually negotiated 
discounts. Inderst and Mazzarotto (2008: 1954) suggest a definition of buyer power as the 
bargaining strength that a buyer has with respect to suppliers with whom it trades, where 
its bargaining strength depends on its ability to credibly threaten to impose an opportunity 
cost if it is not granted a concession. 
The traditional economic treatment of bargaining power uses the concept of outside 
options available to buyers and sellers, as summarised in Table 2. The ACCC (2008: 312) 
described these as “the outside option is the best option that either the seller or buyer can 
achieve if they walk away from the negotiations. These walk-away options are the 
minimum negotiated outcome that the respective parties will accept.” The more outside 
options the buyer or seller has the stronger will bargaining position relative to the other 
party (ceteris paribus). Strong outside options for a buyer, or weak outside options for a 
seller, will be a major source of buyer power in a bilateral bargaining framework. 
 
Table 2 – Outside options 
Buyer’s Outside Options Seller’s Outside Options 
 
Size of the buyer 
 
Relative size of buyer and seller 
Competition upstream Market power downstream 
Relative size of buyer and seller Financial dependency 
Source: OECD (2008:40-41). See also ACCC (2008 Ch. 14)  
 
Bargaining power cannot be exercised when suppliers are competitive, because it is not 
possible to push suppliers to price below marginal cost. Bargaining power can only be 
exercised when in its absence suppliers would exercise market power, and is a 
countervailing power. This implies the procurement method used when tendering for a 
building or construction project is a determining factor in establishing or depleting buyer 
power. 
As an aside, this is a different approach to the transaction cost economics used by 
researchers such as Winch (1989) and Chang and Ive (2007a and b). Their findings on the 
different characteristics of various procurement systems and the importance of the hold-
up problem and asset specificity when negotiating post-contract changes in specification 
are not directly comparable to the negotiation discussed here. 
 
IMPLICATIONS 
This idea that the extent of bargaining power is the key characteristic in the market for a 
project is discussed below in the context of three issues that have been suggested by other 
researchers as important in relation to market power in construction procurement, 
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collusion, ruinous competition and cost uncertainty associated with the typical single 
price, sealed bid auction. Because public sector clients have to use open or selective 
tenders as their procurement method this discussion directly concerns them, private sector 
clients can and increasingly do use negotiation rather than tendering when awarding 
projects. 
A traditional tender will be a single price, sealed bid auction, awarded to the lowest 
priced bid. In this case there are no negotiations and thus no opportunity to exercise buyer 
power. The conventional rationale for this form of procurement is that the tender itself, 
whether open or selective, creates a competitive market between contractors. When this 
works it is highly effective and can be expected to result in a price that is at or close to the 
market price for the project (implying the successful bid is will be at the contractors 
marginal cost). 
There are two obvious problems with this outcome however. First, competitive tendering 
also creates a powerful incentive for contractors to collude; because that is the only way 
they can increase their profits (see Brockmann 2011 for a detailed explanation and 
analysis of collusion in construction). As a result collusion has been widespread and 
endemic in the industry (see OECD 1976 and 2008). In extreme cases it becomes 
organised on an industry-wide basis, as in the Dutch building and construction industry 
(Van den Heuvel 2005). The Japanese „dango‟ system is another example of systemic 
collusion (Hasagawa 1988). In many countries there are examples of contractors, 
manufacturers and sub-contractors that have been caught and charged with bid-rigging, 
market sharing or price fixing (Transparency International 2005). 
This link between the extensive use of competitive bidding and widespread collusion 
does not seem to have been made by clients and regulators. In Australia the ACCC sees 
pre mixed concrete as an ideal product for cartel arrangements and has found bid rigging, 
price fixing and market sharing arrangements several times. The ACCC has recently 
prosecuted cement firms (Queensland 2007), construction contractors (Queensland in 
2009), air conditioning contractors (WA in 2008), and fire protection companies (NSW 
and Queensland 2000). Despite this track record there has been no discussion about 
reforming tendering practices, particularly in the public sector.  
A second problem is the possibility that low-bid tendering competes away not just profits 
but the ability to invest in future development of industry capability. In his exhaustive 
detailing of the Dutch industry cartel Doree (2004) argued that conventional low-bid 
tendering causes “ruinous competition” between contractors. Such excessive competition 
reduces innovation and R&D, stunts industry development and leads to problems with 
quality, safety and compliance with the law. Controversially he concluded: 
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Industrial economics suggest that a sector of the construction industry, 
dominated by highly competitive price-driven public sector procurement, 
will have a natural tendency to drift towards ruinous competition. This 
situation is typically conducive to concentration and collusion (2004: 154). 
It is unusual to find an economic argument against competition, as with Doree‟s 
suggestion that increased competition might prove counterproductive in the long run. 
Unfortunately he does not provide an alternative procurement system, only that public 
sector agencies “integrity-policies and procedures are being evaluated and sharpened” 
and contractors‟ associations “enforce codes of conduct on their members” (2004: 155). 
The ruinous competition argument is the extreme version of the one above, where Doree 
suggested that the relationship between competitive tendering and collusion has not been 
properly understood, and should be investigated further. While it might be the case that 
competitive tendering produces a race to the bottom, the fact that most contractors 
survive to tender another project suggests that this is not the key issue. 
An alternative is that it just may be that building and construction projects have a 
significant degree of cost uncertainty associated with them. Cost uncertainty can come 
from site conditions, weather, change orders, poor quality documentation, problems in the 
supply chain, breakdown of plant and equipment, price changes for materials over the life 
of the project and so on. There are many possible factors that can affect the final price of 
a project, particularly when it may take a year or more to deliver. It is the reality of this 




Nagle and Holden (1995: 205) point out that a bidder is much more likely to win jobs for 
which they have underestimated costs, and are unlikely to win those for which they have 
overestimated the cost. They suggest the only solution is to add a „fudge factor‟ to each 
bid to reflect an estimate of how much the bidder is likely to have underestimated costs if 
they actually win a bid. This argument was restated by Flygberg et al. (2003) as 
„optimism bias‟ when pricing and bidding for large projects. 
Dyer and Kagel (1996) argued construction contract bidding is usually treated as a 
common value auction. What makes the auction interesting is that bidders have different 
estimates of the true value at the time they bid. If bids decrease with decreasing cost 
estimates, the low bidder faces an adverse selection problem, as they win only with the 
                                                 
1
 Drew (2011) says the term „winner‟s curse‟ was first used in a paper by Capen et al. 
(1971) who used it to describe the outcome of common value auctions in which large 
petroleum companies were competing for drilling rights. The volume of oil contained in 
the well underground is the same for all bidders but at the time of bidding none of the 




lowest estimate of the cost of construction. Thus the low bidder is likely to suffer 
„winner‟s curse‟, winning the item but making below normal or even negative profits. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The distinction between a market made up of similar types of projects and the market for 
a single project is not one that has been developed so far. This paper has argued a market 
is created by the client as they go through the procurement process, and introduced the 
idea that procurement of a project creates an identifiable, though temporary, market for 
goods and services. The discussion pointed out that such a market has distinctive 
characteristics that make it different from other markets. 
In a market with a single buyer, as with a building or construction client, it is possible to 
gain market power through bargaining with potential suppliers. Such bargaining power 
cannot be exercised when suppliers are competitive, and can only be exercised when in its 
absence suppliers would exercise market power. It is therefore a countervailing power 
and thus constrained in its use by circumstances. 
Nonetheless, it is a strange situation when an industry whose clients sacrifice the 
opportunity to negotiate and exercise buyer power is also seen as being too competitive. 
Normally these would be mutually exclusive. However in traditional low-bid tendering 
for building and construction projects this can be the case. From the analysis and 
argument in this paper that outcome can be seen as two distinct but inter-related 
problems. 
The first problem is not the degree of competition but the prevalence of collusion. This 
can be explained in part by the many characteristics of the industry that facilitate 
collusion between contractors (see OECD 2008: 20-22 for details), but it is also a strategy 
contractors can resort to in order to increase profits when tendering competes away not 
just excess returns but also normal profits.  
One reason profits get competed away to nothing, or less than nothing, is the high level of 
cost uncertainty for building and construction work. The eventual profitability of a project 
cannot be known at commencement. Cost uncertainty is an unavoidable fact in building 
and construction projects. There are many factors, including potential issues with the 
physical site, that are unknown when commencing, and supplier and subcontractor 
performance and prices on a project that may take a year or more to deliver while market 
conditions fluctuate. It is cost uncertainty that leads to the idea of the „winners curse‟ 
when successful with a low-bid tender. 
This paper has argued that there has not been much previous research into the dynamics 
of the project as a temporary market, despite the importance of projects in the industry. 
The propositions that procurement creates a market, that the roles of participants in that 
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market, and the price and profitability outcomes have been suggested as important in 
developing our understanding of the industry and its dynamics. They are also interesting, 
as a source of testable hypotheses and further research. 
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36th Australasian University Building Educators
Association (AUBEA) Conference
Wednesday 27 to Friday 29 April 2011 - Bond University, Gold Coast,
Australia
Getting a building degree - the end of the beginning? 
In 2011, Bond University’s Institute of Sustainable Development & Architecture will host the
36th Australasian University Building Educators Association [AUBEA] Conference, which is
shaping up to be a little different.
The focus will be on collegiate engagement through a series of plenary sessions that will
address contemporary and controversial issues facing universities and their interface with the
professions.
To kick-start the conference, a Welcome Reception will be held on Wednesday evening, 27th
April. Following the Welcome Reception, the main conference will be held at Bond University
over two days. Thursday will be taking on an educational perspective concerning teaching
strategy, quality and effectiveness; while Friday will be focusing on a vocational perspective
concerning industry relevance, life-long learning and collaboration. Each day will comprise one
prominent guest speaker to set the scene, followed by structured discussions facilitated by
discipline experts. The 36th Australasian University Building Educators Association
Conference will be brought to a close with the much anticipated Conference Dinner on Friday
evening.
Papers on a broad range of topics will be refereed and published in the proceedings, but not
necessarily presented, although there will be a student poster competition with an opportunity
for feedback from delegates during conference breaks and a best paper award open to all.
In addition, there will be an offer to publish an extended version of the best research papers in
a special issue of the Australasian Journal of Construction Economics and Building.
There are a number of surprises in store including an ‘all singing and dancing’ performance
from the Chair of AUBEA and his entourage. You won’t want to miss this event, held at Bond
University on the Gold Coast.
The conference team look forward to catering for a large number of delegates keen to share
their ideas and their time to make a significant contribution to the future teaching of
construction-related disciplines within and beyond our region.
About AUBEA
The principal aim of Australasian University Building Educators Association [AUBEA] is to
promote and improve teaching and research in building through communication and
collaboration. It also aims to coordinate efforts to market the discipline of building to
prospective students, research partners and clients.
AUBEA is a membership-based organisation, with its members being drawn from the
community of universities that teach and research in building, property and construction in
Australasia.
The AUBEA executive meets each year and AUBEA holds an annual conference.
AUBEA maintains a strong connection to industry and in particular the professional institutes,
all of which actively sponsor the annual AUBEA conference. Industry partners include: 
The Australian Institute of Building [AIB]
The Australian institute of Quantity Surveyors [AIQS]
Australian Institute of Building Surveyors [AIBS]
The Chartered Institute of Building [CIOB]
The Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors [RICS]
The 2010 AUBEA conference, hosted by the University of Melbourne, was the 35th in
succession. The host institution for 2011 is Bond University.
Conference Papers
View the Conference Papers
When
27 April 2011 - 29 April 2011
Where
Princeton Room, Bond University
Gold Coast, Australia
Contact Information
For further details please contact:
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